CIA - Contras
Report on Drug Connection between the CIA and the CONTRAS
[BACK]
NORTHERN FRONT CONTRAS
What drug trafficking allegations was CIA aware of, and when, involving Northern Front Contras?
How did CIA respond to this information, and how was this information shared with other U.S.
Government entities?
Adolfo Calero
530.Background. Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, an American-educated businessman and politician, was originally
active--as were many other Nicaraguan political figures who went on to become Contra leaders--in working
to bring down the regime of Anastasio Somoza. After Somoza's ouster in 1979, U.S. Embassy officials
reported from Managua that Calero initially sought to work with the FSLN Government, claiming that all
sectors needed to contribute to the political and economic reconstruction of Nicaragua. However, Calero had
publicly criticized the Sandinistas by late 1980 for "setting themselves up as gods." In December 1982, he left
Nicaragua in protest of FSLN policies.
531.On leaving Nicaragua, Calero joined the FDN and became a member of its leadership. In January 1983, he
traveled to Panama, Costa Rica and Colombia to seek support. That same month, he helped draft a FDN
peace initiative calling for elections, pluralism, nonalignment in foreign affairs, and respect for individual and
human rights. Calero later became President and Commander-in-Chief of the FDN, the preeminent Contra
group that pursued resistance activities on the Northern Front from bases in Honduras.
532.When pressures to unify the Contra forces led to the creation of UNO in mid-1985, Calero--along with
Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo--was named to share authority and decision making control of the military
effort. Disputes with Cruz and Robelo led to Calero's resignation from the UNO leadership in early 1987.
However, with the founding of a successor coalition, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN), in May of that year,
Calero was restored to a senior leadership position. In that position, Calero differed with Enrique Bermudez,
the RN military commander, over strategies for cease fire negotiations.
533.Allegations of Drug Trafficking. A number of Central American publications and public figures mentioned
the Northern Contra Front forces in the context of broad-based charges of drug trafficking by the Contras. A
cable informed Headquarters in February 1988 that a Nicaraguan exile had alleged at a meeting in Miami,
Florida, that Enrique Bermudez, Adolfo Calero, Aristides Sanchez, and another individual were all involved in
drug smuggling. The purpose of the meeting in Miami at which this allegation was made was to invite former
Nicaraguan National Guard members to return to Nicaragua under a Sandinista amnesty program. The
Nicaraguan exile reportedly offered no substantiation for his allegations. According to the cable, he had been
characterized by both a U.S. law enforcement source and CIA as mentally unstable.
534.CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. According to a February 1988 Headquarters cable,
CIA records were searched in February 1988 regarding the Nicaraguan exile in response to his allegations
that Calero and other UNO/FDN leaders had engaged in drug smuggling. The cable indicated that a number
of sources characterized him as unstable, a swindler and as having a reputation of being a drug dealer in
Nicaragua before leaving that country in 1983.
535.Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. In February 1988, the information contained
in the February 1988 cable concerning the drug trafficking allegation by the Nicaraguan exile against Calero
and other Contra leaders was forwarded by CIA to the FBI.
536.No record has been found to indicate that the allegation received by CIA regarding Calero and drug
trafficking was reported to Congress.
Enrique Bermudez
537.Background. Enrique Bermudez Varela served as an officer in the Nicaraguan National Guard Corps of
Engineers from 1952-1979. During his military career, he was a student at the U.S. Army School of the
Americas, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Inter-American Defense College.
After completing his study at the Inter-American Defense College, Bermudez was assigned as the Nicaraguan
Defense Attaché in Washington from 1976 to 1979. During that period, Bermudez was openly critical of the
Somoza Regime and its General Staff.
538.Subsequent to the Sandinistas' consolidation of control in Nicaragua as the Government of National
Reconstruction (GRN), Bermudez was identified in the first half of 1980 as the "War Chief" of the
anti-Sandinista organization, Democratic Armed Force. In the spring of 1981, Bermudez was identified as the
Chief of the Military arm of the Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ADREN), the 15th of
September Legion. In September 1981, the ADREN merged with the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN)
and formed the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).
539.Bermudez was ousted as the FDN's Chief of General Staff in late 1982 as part of the restructuring of the
FDN, and he was then appointed the "Political-Military Coordinator" of the FDN Directorate with
responsibility for oversight of the FDN's military organization. Nevertheless, he remained the de facto leader
of the FDN military organization. In January 1983, he identified himself as the FDN directorate member
responsible for military affairs and effectively the "Commander-in-Chief" of FDN forces. In February 1984,
the FDN General Staff was abolished and replaced by a combined Civil-Military command with Adolfo
Calero as Commander-in-Chief and Enrique Bermudez as Chief, Military Affairs.
540.Throughout the 1980s, Bermudez was dogged by attacks on his leadership and by accusations that he was a
Somoza supporter and that he had attempted to recruit former Nicaraguan National Guard personnel into the
FDN. Bermudez was finally ousted by the Army of the Nicaraguan Resistance (ERN)/North General Staff
from his position as the resistance's senior military leader in February 1990.
541.On February 16, 1991, Bermudez was assassinated in Managua, Nicaragua. Speculation was widespread
that he was killed by Sandinista supporters.
542.Allegations of Drug Trafficking. A September 1981 cable informed Headquarters that reportedly
Bermudez had advised the ADREN leadership against engaging in drug smuggling to the United States, but
that a decision had been made to pursue such activities to finance ADREN's anti-Sandinista operations.
Reportedly, as a result, an initial effort was made in July 1981 when an ADREN member carried cocaine to
Miami aboard a commercial flight. Although Bermudez was the ADREN Military Chief and a member of the
ADREN leadership, there was no indication that he was directly involved in such activities.
543.A February 1988 cable informed Headquarters that a Nicaraguan exile had alleged at a meeting in Miami,
Florida that Enrique Bermudez, Adolfo Calero, Aristides Sanchez, and another individual were all involved in
drug smuggling. The purpose of the meeting in Miami at which this allegation was made was to invite former
Nicaraguan National Guard members to return to Nicaragua under a Sandinista amnesty program. The
Nicaraguan exile reportedly offered no substantiation for the allegation that any of the named Contra leaders
were involved in drug smuggling. Both a U.S. law enforcement source and CIA had characterized him as
mentally unstable.
544.CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. The September 1981 allegation that the ADREN had
decided to smuggle drugs into the United States to finance its activities was disseminated by CIA on
September 14, 1981 in a cable to the State Department; DIA; NSA; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command; and U.S. Ambassadors in Central America. The information also was disseminated to DEA, FBI,
Customs, Treasury, and Intelligence Community agencies on October 28, 1981 as an Intelligence Information
Report.
545.In February 1982, CIA Headquarters responded to a name trace request with a cable stating that Enrique
Bermudez "is not associated with the 'renegade' 15th of September Legion members who are probably using
their acquaintance with him as a means to gain some respectability." The 15th of September Legion was the
designation of the military wing of the ADREN and was described by the Headquarters cable as engaged in
criminal activities, including drug smuggling.
546.A CIA records search was conducted in February 1988 regarding the Nicaraguan exile in response to his
allegations that month that Bermudez and other UNO/FDN leaders had engaged in drug smuggling. The
search, according to a February 1988 Headquarters cable, indicated that a number of sources characterized
him as unstable, a swindler and as having a reputation of being a drug dealer in Nicaragua before leaving that
country in 1983.
547.Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. As mentioned earlier, a CIA intelligence
report entitled "ADREN Operations to Smuggle Narcotics Into the U.S. to Finance Its Anti-Sandinista
Activities" was disseminated to DEA, FBI, Customs Service, Treasury, and Intelligence Community agencies
on October 28, 1981. The report related the allegation that the ADREN leadership intended to smuggle
drugs into the United States to finance its activities against the GRN. The report also included the allegation
that, in the initial effort in July 1981, cocaine was carried to Miami aboard a commercial flight by an ADREN
member. The information had been shared with the State Department, DIA, NSA, Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Ambassadors in Central America by cable on September 14, 1981.
548.On February 9, 1988, the information contained in the February 1988 cable concerning the drug trafficking
allegation by the Nicaraguan exile against Bermudez and other Contra leaders was forwarded by CIA to the
FBI.
549.No record has been found to indicate that either of the allegations received by CIA regarding Bermudez and
drug trafficking was reported to the Congress.
Mario Jose Calero
550.Background. In the mid-1980s, Mario Calero, the brother of Contra leader Adolfo Calero, was the FDN's
purchasing agent in New Orleans. An August 1985 cable to Headquarters reported that the FDN had
contracted with a Honduran-registered airplane charter company named "Compania ORBE" to transport
non-lethal aid from New Orleans to the FDN. The company was reported to be operating one DC-6. The
cable indicated that FDN officials had become uneasy in dealing with ORBE officials because they charged
the FDN unusually low rates, appeared to be overly eager to please and appeared to not be knowledgeable
about certain aspects of the air charter business. As a result of these concerns, the FDN reportedly had
decided that FDN personnel would not be allowed to accompany the DC-6 when it returned to the United
States after each charter flight. Moreover, the cable indicated that Mario Calero had informed unnamed U.S.
law enforcement officials that the ORBE aircraft was only under charter by the FDN when it carried FDN
cargo from New Orleans to Honduras, and was not under FDN charter on its return flights to the United
States.
551.In July 1988, Mario Calero and six other individuals were indicted in Miami, Florida, for Neutrality Act
violations involving arms smuggling. However, the charges against Calero and five of the six other defendants
were dismissed in July 1989.
552.Allegations of Drug Trafficking. A February 1986 cable to Headquarters reported an allegation that
Mario Calero was engaged in drug trafficking. No specific details of the alleged drug trafficking were
provided, although the cable noted that the individual making the allegation provided it to an FDN supporter
following a meeting with Eden Pastora. No information has been found to indicate that CIA took any action
to investigate the validity of the allegation. The FDN supporter and the individual who reportedly made the
allegation say they do not know of any information linking Mario Calero to drug trafficking.
553.An April 1988 cable to Headquarters reported that a person had been approached by several individuals,
including Mario Calero, who were interested in locating an alternative airport for shipping supplies to the
Contras. The individuals also reportedly indicated they had an unspecified association with CIA. The person
who had been approached said that, although he had no basis for his suspicions, he was concerned that these
persons might take advantage of his good name by sending illegal supplies to the Contras or engaging in drug
trafficking.
554.In December 1985, a cable reported to Headquarters that the Associated Press planned to publish a story on
the FDN that included a claim that Mario Calero was taking kickbacks on FDN arms purchases. The cable
did not provide any specific information, however, regarding the nature and extent of the alleged kickbacks.
555.In December 1985, a cable informed Headquarters that rumors were circulating in the local Latin community
to the effect that Mario Calero was personally profiting from U.S.-originated aid for the FDN that transited
New Orleans and that CIA was aware of this. The cable also said that the FBI and U.S. Customs Service
had received similar reports, some possibly generated by media inquiries regarding Calero's activities. The
cable added that there was no information to substantiate the allegations and that there was no indication of
any CIA contacts with Mario Calero in New Orleans.
556.A December 1985 response observed that the allegations may have been based on jealousy and speculation,
especially with respect to Mario Calero's expanded activities as a purchasing agent acting on behalf of the
DoS-sponsored Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO).
557.CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. No information has been found to indicate that CIA
took any action in response to allegations of drug trafficking by Calero. However, a November 1986
Headquarters cable warned that Mario Calero's poor reputation was a potential hindrance to the Contras:
Mario Calero has one of the most seamy reputations of all the people involved in the Nicaraguan
Democratic Resistance. Rightly or wrongly, he is seen as being up to his knees in corruption.
Moreover, he is viewed as being nothing more than a hatchet man for the hardcore
unreconstructed right of the FDN. In short, he is a symbol to our critics of all that is perceived to be
rotten in the FDN. Whether or not this reputation is justified is immaterial: it is real.
558.Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. In March 1986, CIA responded to a trace
request from the FBI by noting that it had received unconfirmed allegations that Calero had accepted
kickbacks. Additionally, the CIA response stated that CIA would appreciate any information the FBI could
provide regarding the allegations. No information has been found to indicate such a response from the FBI.
559.No information has been found to indicate that Congress was informed that CIA had received drug trafficking
allegations against Mario Calero. However, a June 12, 1985 routing slip from the DO to CIA's Comptroller
contained, as an attachment, DO responses to a number of questions regarding the Contras that the House
Appropriations Committee (HAC) had asked CIA on May 2, 1985. One question related to allegations of
corruption by Contra officials. A portion of the DO response to that question stated:
There have been a number of allegations that Mario Calero may be skimming funds from NHAO
but we have nothing to confirm it. The Agency is by law forbidden to engage in law enforcement
activities in the U.S. . . . .
No information has been found to indicate the date and circumstances of CIA's conveyance of this
information to the HAC.
Juan Ramon Rivas
560.Background. Juan Rivas, whose war name was El Quiche, was a former Nicaraguan National Guard officer
who joined the Contra resistance in 1981. Upon the organization of the FDN, he became the instructor of the
first fighters to enter Nicaragua in July 1982. He later helped organize the Jorge Salazar Force, an FDN
combat unit, and became its commander. By August 1986, Rivas had constructed a task force of five regional
commands with a total of 5,000 combatants. He was selected to be Chief of Staff of the ERN/North in
March 1988, the only candidate who apparently was acceptable to all the commanders.
561.A CIA employee who dealt with the Contras from 1986 to 1988 says Rivas "was a subordinate of [ERN
military commander] Enrique Bermudez and interfaced with representatives of the Agency as Enrique
Bermudez would empower him to do so on any particular issue." In this regard Rivas was acting no differently
than other Contra commanders.
562.Allegations of Drug Trafficking. According to a February 1989 cable to Headquarters, a Central
American Station "was asked to check out a report in November 1988 received by the [U.S.] Embassy from
DEA alleging" that Rivas was identical with a person of the same name who had reportedly escaped from a
Colombian prison after being arrested on a drug trafficking charge.
563.According to the February cable, a CIA contract officer noted Rivas had said he had deserted from the
Nicaraguan National Guard in 1979 when the first combat with the FSLN began in southern Nicaragua. At
that point, Rivas said he had relocated to Guatemala, acquired a false passport and shortly thereafter moved
to Colombia to find work. Rivas reportedly said that he became involved in the drug trade at a low
level--packaging drugs; transporting them within the city of Barranquilla, Colombia; and passing them to
traffickers for overseas shipment. He claimed, however, that he did not personally smuggle drugs outside of
Colombia. The Colombian authorities caught him, and he was sent to prison. Rivas, then 21 years of age,
remained in prison for four or five months before escaping. He said that he then returned to Guatemala,
decided not to return to the drug trade and joined the Nicaraguan resistance.
564.The CIA independent contractor says pursuing this question with Rivas was very difficult, in part because
Rivas was always surrounded by a lot of "gunmen." Thus, the independent contractor says he believed he
might be at personal risk if he accused Rivas in their presence. Nonetheless, he says he attempted to verify
the DEA information. The problem of the gunmen took some time to resolve, but eventually he was able to
discuss the allegation with Rivas alone.
565.The CIA independent contractor adds that Rivas had said that he had been involved in Colombia in taking
drugs to ships in international waters. The CIA contract officer also says that Rivas told him he arranged the
escape from the Colombian prison by paying a bribe.
566.The CIA independent contractor says that he never saw Rivas again after their discussion. He states that he
does not believe Rivas was involved in drug trafficking while working with the Contras. He notes that Rivas
had a horse at the Yamales camp that was reputedly worth $100,000. However, he said that he does not
believe the source of Rivas' funds was drug trafficking, but Rivas' family money and overcharging the Agency
for supplies.
567.As reported in a March 1989 cable to Headquarters, Bermudez said that, when Rivas joined the resistance
forces:
. . . he had quite a bit of money. At the time [Rivas] had just broken a relationship with [an
American] who was the daughter of a very rich US citizen and those who met [Rivas] at the time
assumed his money came from the girl and/or her father. [Rivas] contributed most of his remaining
resources to the FDN cause and has only a small ranch in Guatemala left from his earlier
relationship. Some in the FDN may have suspected at the time that the father-in-law was engaged
in drug trafficking.
568.CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. Following receipt of the information the CIA contract
officer obtained from Rivas, CIA briefed the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras and the Deputy Chief of
Mission. The February 1989 cable to Headquarters reported that Rivas' departure from the ERN would be
"devastating," but that there appeared to be no other option.
569.In February 1989, Headquarters responded and requested that Rivas' admissions be discussed with the DEA
representative at the Embassy, who was to be asked to take no action at that time and to "advise him that [the
CIA] will inform [DEA Headquarters] on his behalf when appropriate." The cable also noted that it presumed
the Ambassador would support this position in discussions with the DEA representative in view of the serious
political damage to the U.S. Government that could occur should the information about Rivas become public.
570.The cable also indicated that Headquarters was particularly interested in knowing whether the DEA
representative was obliged to inform the Government of Colombia of the admissions and whether Rivas was
on a DEA "watchlist." The cable also provided instructions to discuss Rivas' admissions with Enrique
Bermudez and asked whether he had any prior knowledge of Rivas' drug connection. The cable contained a
caution that it was important that no U.S. Government official encourage Rivas "to disappear" and that there
were significant legal liabilities--not further explained--to providing Rivas any such advice or encouragement.
571.In February 1989, a cable informed Headquarters that the Rivas case had been discussed with the DEA
representative. The DEA representative reportedly said that there was no DEA action to be taken since the
information concerning Rivas was "historic" and there was no indication of current trafficking by Rivas. The
DEA representative also reportedly said that DEA had no obligation to inform the Government of Colombia
and that Rivas was not on any DEA watchlist.
572.On February 15, 1989, CATF sent a memorandum to Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) Richard Stolz
outlining Rivas' background and his admissions of involvement in the drug trade in 1979. CATF proposed
that, because of his importance to the Contras, Rivas be maintained as the Chief of Staff of ERN/North and
that the House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee for
Intelligence (SSCI) be briefed. The CATF memorandum noted that:
. . . although this recommendation is not without political risk, the removal of Rivas, at this time,
following the Central American Presidents' call for the dissolution of the ERN as an armed force,
would adversely impact ERN morale and force integrity [sic] to an unquantifiable extent.
573.A February 22, 1989 note for DDO Stolz from Deputy General Counsel for Operations John Rizzo stated
that:
Under the circumstances, I do not believe that the existence of the 1979 drug charges requires us
to remove Rivas as ERN/N[orth] Chief of Staff or otherwise disassociate ourselves from him. CIA
regulations in this area focus solely on individuals currently in narcotics trafficking: we have to
sever our relationship with anyone involved in trafficking to the United States, and we have to
make a risk/benefit analysis about continuing to deal with anyone involved in trafficking outside the
U.S. There is no indication that Rivas fits either category. What we have here is a single, relatively
petty transgression in a foreign country that occurred a decade ago and that is apparently of no
current interest to DEA.
(Underlining in original.)
574.A March 1989 cable to Headquarters stated that the Rivas matter had been discussed with Bermudez the
previous day. Reportedly, Rivas had already approached Bermudez and explained the problem. The cable
noted that, according to Bermudez, Rivas indicated that he wished to resign from the resistance. Bermudez
said he had calmed Rivas down and pointed out that his resignation at such a critical time would have
"devastating affects [sic]." Rivas took some time off and then resumed his functions. He was, reportedly,
waiting for guidance from Bermudez, "who recognizes the possibility of a scandal but does not want Rivas to
leave."
575.A March 1989 Headquarters cable noted that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Cresencio Arcos, along with the CATF Chief of Operations, had met with Bermudez in Washington. Arcos
reportedly told Bermudez that Inter-American Affairs Assistant Secretary-Designate Bernard Aronson and
Acting Inter-American Affairs Assistant Secretary Michael Kozak had decided that Rivas' admission of
involvement in drug trafficking in 1979 necessitated his separation from the Contras as soon as possible. In
order to prevent Rivas' departure from being viewed erroneously by ERN troops as a signal of imminent
demobilization, Arcos advised Bermudez that Rivas should fade gradually from the scene. Bermudez agreed
with this assessment and said that Rivas would be amenable to this approach as long as he had a way to earn
a living.
576.In March 1989, a cable informed Headquarters that the Station's COS, the Ambassador and the Deputy
Chief of Mission agreed that recent media coverage of ERN human rights violations made the ERN more
vulnerable to drug trafficking charges "no matter how far removed." As a result of this discussion, the Deputy
Chief of Mission was instructed by the Ambassador to meet with Rivas as soon as possible and inform him
that he must leave the ERN. The cable reported that the Deputy Chief of Mission was also to ask Rivas if he
knew of anyone else in the ERN who had been involved in drug trafficking.
577.According to an April 1989 cable to Headquarters, Rivas announced on March 29 his intention to resign for
medical reasons.
578.At some unspecified time in early 1989, most probably in late April, a CATF officer drafted a cable to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regarding an application by Rivas for U.S. Permanent Resident
Alien (PRA) status. The cable draft described Rivas' involvement in drug trafficking in Colombia as well as his
arrest, incarceration and escape. It also described Rivas' service with the Contras, noting that he had served
with distinction and saying that the Agency had no evidence that Rivas had been involved with illegal drugs
since 1979. The draft concluded with a request "that Rivas' service be taken into consideration at the time that
his application for PRA status is reviewed."
579.The version of the cable that was actually transmitted to INS and the FBI on May 6, 1989 omitted the
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