U.S. Supreme Court
LOVING v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996)
LOVING
v.
UNITED STATES
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
No. 94-1966.
Argued January 9, 1996
Decided June 3, 1996
A general court-martial found petitioner Loving, an Army private, guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 918(1), (4). Finding three aggravating factors-(1) that the premeditated murder was committed during a robbery, Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) the premeditated murder, had committed a second murder, also proved at his single trial, RCM 1004(c)(7)(J)-the court-martial sentenced Loving to death. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. The United States Army Court of Military Review and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed, rejecting Loving's attack on the promulgation by Executive Order of the aggravating factors in RCM 1004. He contends that the Eighth Amendment and the separation-of-powers doctrine require that Congress, not the President, make the fundamental policy determination respecting the factors that warrant the death penalty.
[Excerpts from the Syllabus.]
2. The President's prescription of the challenged aggravating factors did not violate the separation-of-powers principle. Pp. 6-25.
(a) The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine, a strand of this Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence, is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I, Section(s) 1, and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity, Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692. This principle does not mean, however, that only Congress can make a rule of prospective force. Although it may not delegate the power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, Congress may delegate to others the authority or discretion to execute the law under and in pursuance of its terms. Id., at 693-694. Pp. 6-10.
IV. [Excerpt from the case.]
Deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule is not the sole reason for dispersing the federal power among three branches, however. By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both effective and accountable. Article I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking. See Chadha, supra, at 951. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. The clear assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.
There is no absolute rule, furthermore, against Congress' delegation of authority to define criminal punishments. We have upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations "confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute." United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 518 (1911). See also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). The exercise of a delegated authority to define crimes may be sufficient in certain circumstances to supply the notice to defendants the Constitution requires.
See M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946). In the circumstances presented here, so too may Congress delegate authority to the President to define the aggravating factors that permit imposition of a statutory penalty, with the regulations providing the narrowing of the death-eligible class that the Eighth Amendment requires.
It does not suffice to say that Congress announced its will to delegate certain authority. Congress as a general rule must also "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928); Touby, 500 U.S., at 165. The intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no more than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes. Field, 143 U. S., at 693-694. Though in 1935 we struck down two delegations for lack of an intelligible principle, A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), we have since upheld, without exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-217, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate radio broadcasting according to "public interest, convenience, or necessity"). Had the delegations here called for the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond the traditional authority of the President, Loving's last argument that Congress failed to provide guiding principles to the President might have more weight. We find no fault, however, with the delegation in this case.
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